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Abstract
This thesis describes the design, implementation, and benchmarking of a software
prototype of EFECT [EFECT], a new certificate scheme that handles revocation
more gracefully than do current schemes. This prototype includes a client browser, a
certificate verification tree library, and a directory server.
The thesis includes analysis, both mathematical and empirical, to determine the
optimal values of EFECT’s parameters in terms of both speed and space. Finally, the
thesis includes a benchmark comparison of the optimized EFECT and a comparable
X.509 [X509] system. This comparison serves as proof that EFECT does indeed
outperform the X.509 scheme in some common scenarios.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The lack of a viable public key infrastructure has been a major barrier to the wide-
spread deployment of encryption and authentication technology. Algorithms have
already been developed that provide the strong encryption and authentication desired
by those who wish to purchase goods or communicate securely over the Internet. The
problem lies in distributing the keys for these algorithms. The current X.509 public
key infrastructure is cumbersome and fails to adequately address the problem of
certificate revocation.
Recent events highlight this revocation problem and the inability of the current
infrastructure to cope with it. In October 2000, it was announced that the private
key of Sun Microsystems1 had probably been compromised. In late January 2001,
imposters posing as Microsoft Corporation managed to get VeriSign to sign a certifi-
cate proclaiming that they were Microsoft. In these cases attackers had the ability
to pose as Sun and Microsoft respectively, gaining all of the software access priv-
ileges accorded to these two large corporations. Technically, these two certificates
were revoked, but since current Web browsers do not perform any sort of checks for
revocation,2 these revocations were effectively meaningless.
1Corporate names mentioned herein are trademarks and/or registered trademarks of their re-
spective companies (Sun Microsystems, Microsoft Corporation, VeriSign, and Netscape).
2In theory, a revocation mechanism exists in the X.509 scheme. In practice, the mechanism is
awkward enough that browser manufacturers avoided implementing it after a few unsuccessful tries
at getting it to work.
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Such high-profile debacles threaten to undermine the credibility of cryptographic
technology in general. Certificate revocation must be addressed if cryptography is to
gain and maintain acceptance.
A new certificate scheme called EFECT has been developed that solves the re-
vocation problem more elegantly than do current certificate schemes like X.509. By
providing a more elegant revocation solution, EFECT will hopefully make manufac-
turers of Web browsers and other security-related products more likely to deal with
revocation properly.
This thesis describes the design and implementation of a software prototype of the
EFECT scheme. It also contributes an analysis of how a parameter of the EFECT
scheme affects the scheme’s performance. Finally, the thesis contributes an experi-
ment comparing the relative performances of X.509 and EFECT. The experimental
results suggest a scenario in which EFECT is a much more appropriate certificate
scheme than X.509.
The structure of the thesis is as follows. The next chapter provides the reader
with enough background in cryptography and key infrastructure to understand the
significance of and motivation for the EFECT scheme. Chapter 3 describes the details
of both the X.509 and EFECT schemes, highlighting the differences between the
two and the advantages gained by using EFECT. Chapter 4 lists the requirements
for the EFECT prototype and describes the design decisions made to meet those
requirements. Chapter 5 provides specific implementation details about each part of
the prototype. Chapter 6 describes results from two experiments: one involving the
optimization of an EFECT parameter, and one comparing the relative performances
of EFECT and X.509 in an off-line, bulk verification scenario. Chapter 7 lists ideas
for future improvement of the EFECT prototype. Chapter 8 concludes the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter gives the reader enough background in cryptography and key infrastruc-
ture to understand the significance of the EFECT scheme. It describes the major
cryptographic paradigms in the order they occurred historically, explaining the prob-
lems at each stage and how these problems were solved by the next stage. It begins
with the problem of insecure communication and the solution of secret key cryptog-
raphy. It ends with the problem of certificate revocation, which leads us into our
discussion of EFECT in chapter 3.
2.1 The Need for Cryptography
The need for cryptography is a very old one. Militaries have always wanted secure
communication channels for delivering messages. With the current popularity of
communicating over computer networks, this need for secure channels has spread to
the population at large.
Communications over computer networks are inherently insecure: they can be
both eavesdropped and manipulated without either communicating party’s knowl-
edge. In order to secure these communications, we turn to cryptography for encryp-
tion and authentication.
Encryption gives us privacy. It obscures the messages being sent over the network,
so that only the authorized parties can read them.
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Authentication gives us the ability to trust messages. When messages are au-
thenticated, the parties can be assured that the messages are correct (have not been
tampered with) and that they are from the proper party (and not an imposter).
A cryptographic key infrastructure gives us both encryption and authentication
capabilities.
2.2 Secret Key Infrastructure
In the early days of cryptography, encryption and authentication were achieved using
secret key cryptography. Secret key cryptography requires that the two parties doing
the encryption and authentication share a common secret (the secret key).
This is a cumbersome requirement. Probably the worst part of the requirement
is that in order to have secure communications, the two parties must have already
agreed on a shared secret. If they have a way to agree on a shared secret, then it
would seem they already have a secure communication channel. It may be possible for
two parties to share a key in person, and then go on to communicate over a network,
but this approach does not scale well to something like the Internet where people
frequently do not have the option of meeting in person before communicating.
2.3 Public Key Infrastructure
Since the publication of [DH], focus has shifted to public key cryptography. Public
key cryptography’s key infrastructure requirements are more reasonable than those
for secret key cryptography. Each party has a pair of keys: one public and one private.
Private keys are not revealed. Public keys are published for everyone in the group
to see. All parties know the algorithms D, E, S, and V for decryption, encryption,
signing, and verification respectively. These algorithms are all keyed.
These requirements are more easily met than those for secret key cryptography.
Two parties need not share a secret before communicating. Each party just needs
knowledge of the other’s public key.
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2.3.1 Encryption
Public key infrastructure allows anyone with a given public key K, to send encrypted
messages to the party associated with K. As previously mentioned, the two parties
need not share a secret before the communication.
To encrypt a message m to Bob, Alice (or anyone else) would use Bob’s public
key B as follows to produce a ciphertext c: EB(m) = c. To decrypt this ciphertext c,
Bob would use his private key b as follows to obtain the message m: Db(c) = m.
2.3.2 Digital Signatures
Public key infrastructure also allows parties to create digital signatures, cryptographic
analogs of traditional paper and ink signatures. Digital signatures are different on
each document that is signed, unlike those of the paper and ink variety. A signature
by the party associated with public key K can be verified by anyone who knows K
(anyone involved in the key infrastructure). This verification means two things: that
the signed message has not been tampered with since the signature, and that the
message was signed by the key holder and not someone else.
To sign a message m, Bob would use his private key b as follows to produce
signature σ: Sb(m) = σ. To verify this signature σ, Alice (or anyone else) would use
Bob’s public key B as follows: VB(m,σ) = true if and only if σ = Sb(m).
2.3.3 The Problem of Public Key Spoofing
At first glance, public key infrastructure seems to have solved all of the problems of
the secret key infrastructure. Upon closer inspection though, we see that it assumes
that everyone knows which public key belongs to which party.
Let us see what would happen if this were not the case. A malicious party who
wished to read messages sent to Bob could advertise his own public key M as Bob’s
public key (which would really be B, not M). If Alice were to come across this key
M when trying to send messages to Bob, she might encrypt using M . In this case,
the malicious party could read these messages since he would have the private key
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corresponding to the public key used in the encryption.
This “spoofing” of public keys is a significant problem with public key infrastruc-
ture. In order for the system to work, everyone involved must know without a doubt
which key belongs to which party.
2.4 Certificates and Certification Authorities
The usual solution to the public key spoofing problem is to have a trusted authority
who issues digitally signed statements that bind identities to public keys. These
signed statements are called certificates. The trusted authority issuing the certificates
is called a certification authority or a CA for short.
It is assumed that all users obtain the CA’s public key in a secure manner. This can
be done in person, but in practice it is often done by hard-coding the key into software
that all parties run. For example, a commercial CA called VeriSign distributes their
public key with Netscape’s Web browser.
Once users have this one key, they can securely find anyone else’s public key either
in an on-line certificate directory or from the CA directly. This solves both the prob-
lem of shared secrets and the problem of public key spoofing. Now to communicate
securely with Bob, Alice would simply get Bob’s certificate (from a directory or the
CA) before using it to encrypt the messages she wanted to send. By verifying the
CA’s signature on the certificate, Alice would know positively that the key on the
certificate was indeed Bob’s public key. Alice could also sign her messages to Bob
with her private key. Bob would decrypt the messages with his private key. He could
also verify Alice’s signatures by obtaining Alice’s certificate, verifying that certificate
with the CA’s public key, and then verifying Alice’s signatures with the public key in
Alice’s certificate.
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2.5 The Problem of Certificate Revocation
With a CA in place signing certificates, it is easy to find the proper key needed
to communicate with someone. The problem is that private keys can be stolen or
compromised. It is worth noting that certificates usually have a natural expiration
date written on them. Certificates are only valid if the signature is good and they
have not expired. This is meant to coincide with the lifetime of a cryptographic key,
but key compromise is not a predictable phenomenon.
The problem arises when a key is compromised before its certificate expires natu-
rally. If Alice’s private key a is stolen, she should stop using the key pair (a,A), and
create a new one: (a′, A′). Unfortunately, there will still be a signed statement from
the CA claiming that Alice’s public key is A. Digital signatures cannot be undone,
so what is the CA to do at this point?
The usual solution is to have the CA issue a statement saying that the key A has
been revoked. The CA must also issue a new certificate for A′. The problem then
becomes how to distribute this revocation notice to everyone in the system. Without
proper distribution of this revocation notice, people using the system would continue
using A to encrypt messages to Alice, resulting in insecure communication. This is
known as the certificate revocation problem.
The current solutions to this problem are cumbersome. The solution used by
today’s most common system involves the CA issuing very large lists of revoked
certificates that everyone must check before using a certificate for communication.
Downloading and scanning through these lists can take significant time and band-
width, especially as the lists grow large. This solution is far from satisfactory, and
the EFECT solution is better in many cases.
Chapter 3 will discuss in more detail how current systems deal with the problem
of revocation, and will then explain EFECT’s more elegant solution to the problem.
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Chapter 3
EFECT
For more information on any of the schemes mentioned in this chapter, the reader
is referred either to [EFECT], which describes each scheme in some detail, or to the
original papers listed in the bibliography. When we speak of determining the freshness
of a certificate in this chapter, we are referring to determining that the certificate has
been issued and has not been revoked.
3.1 X.509 Certificates and CRL’s
The “Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure”[X509] is currently the most com-
monly deployed certificate scheme. The scheme uses X.509 certificates and certificate
revocation lists (CRL’s). An X.509 certificate contains a serial number, the names of
the CA and the user, the public key of the user, dates of issuance and expiration, and
a signature from the CA over all of these fields. A CRL is a CA-signed list of serial
numbers of revoked certificates.
In the X.509 certificate scheme, determining freshness of a certificate involves
downloading the latest CRL from a repository, verifying the CA signature on that
CRL, and searching the CRL for the serial number of the certificate in question. It
is worth noting that one must download a new CRL as often as certificates can be
revoked: weekly revocation means downloading one CRL per week, daily revocation
means one CRL per day, etc. Given Micali’s estimate of a 10% certificate revocation
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rate, these CRL downloads can take a significant amount of time and bandwidth
given a CA that revokes things quickly and serves millions of customers.
3.2 Revocation: A New Perspective
X.509 and other current certificate schemes handle revocation using different strate-
gies, but there is a similarity shared by all of these strategies: determining freshness
is a separate process from obtaining the certificate. This means that communicating
securely involves two initial steps: obtaining a person’s certificate, and then obtaining
information about the freshness of that certificate. Basically, a certificate is not useful
without more current knowledge about its freshness.1
Let us assume that revocation information is updated daily (current schemes op-
erate under a similar time frame). If we have to recheck the freshness of a certificate
daily, having the certificate itself seems of little use. If we must recheck the certificate
on-line each day, why not just get the certificate itself at the same time? Why not
issue certificates daily with an expiration time of a day? It would provide the same
freshness guarantee while simplifying the two-step process down to a single step. This
is the central idea behind EFECT. Certificates are reissued daily, eliminating the need
for revocation without sacrificing any freshness.
3.3 The EFECT Scheme
As previously mentioned, a CA in the EFECT scheme reissues every certificate on a
daily basis (certificates expire daily). To update the certificate of a compromised key,
there is no longer a need to issue a revocation statement and a new certificate. We
simply alter the certificate the next day to reflect the key change. When a user gets a
certificate, she knows it has not been revoked within a day. This freshness guarantee
is exactly the same as the one provided by current two-step schemes.
1We assume that users of these systems check for revocation. Not bothering to check for revo-
cation is not considered an acceptable solution in this thesis or in [EFECT]. Think of the financial
problems of a store that did not bother to verify its customers’ credit cards.
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Daily reissuing is not feasible using other certificate schemes. Signing millions of
individual certificates at 1 second per signature takes weeks if done as a serial com-
putation. The reason EFECT can do daily reissuing is that EFECT CA’s do not sign
individual certificates. An EFECT CA essentially signs all of a day’s certificates in a
single digital signature, making the computational overhead much more reasonable.
The EFECT CA does this by arranging a day’s certificates as the leaves of a
Merkle tree [Merkle]. A Merkle tree employs a collision-free hash: a cryptographic
primitive for “fingerprinting” data.2 Each certificate is hashed in the leaf nodes.
Sibling node hashes are concatenated and then hashed to compute the hash of the
parent node. This proceeds all the way up to the root of the tree. Due to these
recursive applications of the hash function, the hash value at the root then depends
on every bit of information in the leaves (certificates). By signing this root hash, the
EFECT CA is essentially signing all of the information in all of the certificates for
that day.
Verifying an X.509 certificate involves verifying the digital signature on that cer-
tificate. Then that certificate is checked against a CRL to check for revocation. An
EFECT certificate has no signature on it. Instead, an EFECT certificate contains a
body (the certified information) and a path (the authentication). This path is a list
of hashes up the tree from the certificate leaf to the root, including the sibling hashes
along the way. By verifying the EFECT CA’s signature on the root hash of the tree,
and hashing the certificate body upwards with the provided hashes, the verifier knows
that if the signed root matches her computed root, the certificate is valid. There is
no revocation check since EFECT certificates are issued for one-day periods and are
never revoked.
This path verification works because of the collision-free property of the hash. The
logic is that if someone could give a path to the root that was not in the EFECT CA’s
tree, that person could find collisions in the hash function. Since the hash function is
2A collision-free hash is a function that maps input of an arbitrary length to an output of fixed
length. It has two important and related properties. First, it is hard to invert (to compute the input
given only the output). Also, it is hard to find a collision: two inputs that hash to the same output.
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collision-free, this forgery is infeasible. The curious reader is referred to [Merkle] for
a more rigorous proof of this assertion.
Note that the verification of the EFECT CA’s root signature only needs to happen
once a day for a given verifier. Further verifications only require hashing of the path
from the certificate to the root, plus an equality check against the root hash signed
by the CA.
The CA’s building and hashing of the tree are guaranteed to be efficient. The
underlying tree is a B+tree, so standard tree operations (insertion, deletion, and
search) are guaranteed to be logarithmic in the number of certificates. Each day
involves incremental changes to the tree (to add new certificates and delete old ones),
which may make slight changes to the overall structure of the tree. Only the changed
parts of the tree need to be rehashed. Even the initial hashing of the entire tree does
not take very long since, according to Rivest, hashing is approximately 10,000 times
faster than computing a digital signature. Exact times for this initial building and
hashing can be found in section 6.2.1.
3.4 EFECT Advantages
As will be demonstrated in section 6.2.2, certificate verification is much more effi-
cient in EFECT than in X.509. Additionally, EFECT has other advantages that are
even more important than improved verification speed. This section discusses these
advantages.
3.4.1 Off-line Certificates
Certificates were originally proposed as a mechanism for distributing public keys
securely in an off-line manner. First, Diffie and Hellman [DH] proposed a trusted
directory that would list names and corresponding public keys. They mentioned
specifically that this directory could reside on-line. Later, Kohnfelder [Kohnfelder]
noted that a trusted on-line directory is a performance bottleneck. He proposed
splitting the directory into individually signed entries called certificates. By splitting
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the directory into certificates, users of the system would no longer need to contact a
trusted authority in an on-line manner. With the authority’s public key, certificate
verification could happen off-line.
Given that the original purpose of certificates was to move key distribution off-
line, the EFECT scheme attempts to deal with the revocation problem in as off-line
a manner as possible. For a given verifier in the EFECT scheme, there is only one
on-line communication per day: acquiring the signed root of the day from the CA.
By verifying this one signature in the morning, the verifier can do the rest of the
day’s certificate verifications off-line by comparing the computed root hashes on the
certificates to the signed one.
Note that this attempt to be as off-line as possible is in stark contrast to schemes
such as SDSI/SPKI [SDSI], which require that all freshness checks be made on-line.
It would seem that given the original motivation for certificates, this on-line approach
is hardly an improvement over the original Diffie-Hellman idea of a central, trusted,
on-line directory.
Although not explicitly stated in [X509], it is possible to elicit similarly off-line
behavior from the X.509 scheme. By downloading the day’s CRL in the morning
and verifying the signature on it, a verifier can be off-line for the rest of the day.
The verifier would verify the signature on an X.509 certificate, and then search the
CRL for that certificate’s serial number to verify freshness. This is exactly the mode
of operation used in section 6.2.2 when comparing the performance of X.509 and
EFECT. The advantages of EFECT in this scenario are discussed in detail in that
section.
3.4.2 Stronger CA Security
Since an EFECT CA only computes one signature per day, it can afford to use slower
signature schemes with stronger security properties.
The security of a digital signature scheme generally increases with the length of
the signing key, but unfortunately the amount of time required to sign also increases.
A CA must balance the security gained from a longer key against the need to perform
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a certain number of signatures per day. Since EFECT CA’s compute fewer signatures
per day than X.509 CA’s, an EFECT CA can afford to use a longer key than an X.509
CA for a given user population.
For an EFECT CA, it is also possible to use a threshold scheme where the CA
signing key is split into pieces and distributed around the globe. Some majority of the
pieces would be needed to use the key, but the compromise of less than the majority
of the pieces would not be a problem. The key could be rebuilt and reshared in the
event of a partial compromise, so as to make the compromised shares useless. This
threshold technique greatly enhances security, but is cumbersome for more than a
few signatures. Here as with long keys, the fact that the EFECT CA performs fewer
signatures enables the EFECT CA to use a previously infeasible technique to guard
against CA key compromise.
Finally, the small number of signatures made by an EFECT CA means that there
are less signatures available for cryptanalysis by an adversary than under X.509.
3.4.3 Recovery from CA Key Compromise
The EFECT scheme is more resilient to the compromise of a CA’s private key than
the X.509 scheme is. In the event that a CA private key is compromised, both schemes
require the CA to generate a new key pair, and advertise that new public key over
some secure out-of-band channel.
In addition to generating and distributing the new public key, an EFECT CA
merely re-signs the day’s root hash in the new private key, and broadcasts this re-
signed root hash the same way that it broadcasts the daily root hash each day.3
Unlike the EFECT CA which only has to compute one signature, an X.509 CA
would have to re-sign and redistribute each outstanding certificate in addition to
issuing a CRL revoking each outstanding certificate. Also, this CA key compromise
is more likely to happen to an X.509 CA than an EFECT CA given that the EFECT
3Actually, the CA must re-sign all old roots as well in order for the long term signatures (see
section 3.4.4) to work properly. This is still an improvement over re-signing each certificate under
X.509 when the number of certificates is larger than the number of days for which we archive
signature keys.
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CA can take better security precautions for a similarly sized user population (as
mentioned in section 3.4.2).
3.4.4 Long Term Signatures
While the majority of digital signatures are used to authenticate ephemeral transac-
tions (network logins, session key negotiations, etc.), some signatures must be veri-
fiable for long periods of time. Things like loans, mortgages, and business contracts
must be verifiable for many years after they are signed. The problem then becomes
how to verify a digital signature many years after its creation. To securely verify the
signatures on a signed document, one must have the certified public keys correspond-
ing to the private keys that signed the document.
One strategy to make this work would be for the signers to attach their certifi-
cates to the document being signed (in addition to signing the document with their
respective private keys). The problem then becomes CA compromise. In 30 years, a
CA key is likely to change. One can’t just verify the old certificates using the old CA
key as that key may have been compromised, in which case arbitrary contracts could
be forged. The certificates for the 30 year old public keys must somehow be signed
in the most current CA key to prevent forgery.
In a scheme like X.509 where certificates are individually signed, it is very hard
to make sure that a CA changing its key re-signs all old certificates. The CA would
have to keep track of each certificate issued over the entire contract time span. Over
time, this ends up being a very large storage requirement.
In the EFECT scheme, it is not necessary for the CA to archive entire old certifi-
cate trees. It is enough for the EFECT CA to archive just the daily signed root hashes
of old trees. If the EFECT CA changes keys, it just re-signs the old root hashes using
its new key. This effectively re-certifies all of the old certificates4 without the need
to keep track of each old certificate individually. It is then up to contract signers to
4It makes sense to question whether we should be blindly recertifying old certificates in old trees.
With proper semantics, the answer is yes. By re-signing old roots, the CA is just certifying each old
certificate tree as being the specific certificate tree it had on that given date in the past. The CA is
not certifying that certificates from the old tree are valid in the most current timeframe.
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store their certificates and hash paths of the day along with the signed contract.
A verifier of an old contract would verify (using the current CA public key) the
root hash for the day listed in the contract, verify that the hashes for the attached
certificates hash up to the signed old root hash, and finally verify the signatures on
the document using the public keys specified in the attached certificates.
One final problem remains: compromise of contract signers’ keys. This problem
is not solved by EFECT, nor is it solved by X.509 or any other current certificate
schemes. New forward-secure digital signature schemes such as that of Abdalla and
Reyzin [AR] may help solve this difficult problem.
3.4.5 Atomic Certificates
Our previous notion of a certificate is a narrow one: a CA-signed binding of a public
key to a name. To be more general, a certificate could be any statement signed by
a CA. It could be a statement binding a person’s name to a date of birth or to a
social security number. It is conceivable that eventually there may be CA’s that
certify similar information. Note that unlike public key certificates, some of these
other kinds of certificates may contain sensitive information. Unfortunately, if all of
a user’s sensitive information is put in a single certificate, the user loses the ability
to disclose only the appropriate fields to someone.
In order to provide users with finer-grained control of the disclosure of their infor-
mation, Raghu [atomic] proposed the idea of atomic certificates. Atomic certificates
contain just one certified field, giving the user the power to disclose as little or as
much information as is appropriate. The user would just reveal the atomic certificates
for the appropriate fields.
When comparing the ability of X.509 and EFECT to handle atomic certificates,
it is useful to think of the additional storage overhead per certificate: given one of
a user’s certificates, how much space (not including the certificate body itself) is
required to store another certificate for that user? In the X.509 scheme, having the
first certificate does not help you. Storing another X.509 certificate requires space for
another digital signature. In the EFECT scheme, if a user’s certificates are near each
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other in the tree,5 storing another certificate only requires another couple of hashes.
This is because the hash paths for the two certificates overlap in all but a few hashes
in the bottom.
Most digital signatures (using reasonably large keys) are at least an order of
magnitude larger than the output from commonly used hash functions, so EFECT
allows a user to store more certificates in the same amount of space. Therefore,
atomic certificates can be implemented much more efficiently (in terms of space)
under EFECT than under X.509. This will be especially important in the future,
when certificates are stored on smart cards and other devices with small memories.
3.4.6 Untrusted Directories
In the X.509 scheme, certificates and CRL’s are distributed in various directories
(called “repositories” in [X509]). Having many directories eliminates the bottleneck
of users’ having to get every certificate and CRL directly from the CA. The authors
of [X509] claim that these directories can be untrusted since both certificates and
CRL’s are signed by the CA. While it is true that signed information can be dis-
tributed without any doubts as to its authenticity, it is not true that these directories
can be truly untrusted. If an X.509 certificate does not exist, there is no CA signature
attesting to its non-existence.
This means that a directory can plausibly deny the existence of a certificate re-
gardless of whether that certificate actually exists. This flaw makes possible at least
two unpleasant scenarios. In the first scenario, a company bribes a directory into not
giving out the certificates of the company’s competitors. In the second scenario, a
high-profile directory loses part of its database due to technical problems and tries to
deny that the lost certificates exist (in order to save face). In both of these scenarios,
the user is none the wiser since there is no CA signature attesting to a certificate’s
non-existence.
In the EFECT scheme, it is possible for a directory to prove the non-existence of a
5This is a very reasonable assumption. If the search key for the B+tree is something like
“username-field”, then all of a user’s atomic certificates would indeed be adjacent.
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certificate. The proof uses hash paths from the certificate verification tree similar to
the ones used for certifying the certificates. The only difference is that at the bottom,
the hashes are taken over the search keys instead of over the certificate bodies.
To prove the non-existence of Bob’s certificate, the directory would provide the
search keys on either side of where Bob’s search key would go (say “Alice” and
“Charlie”) and the search key hash paths of these two search keys. By verifying that
the two hash paths were for adjacent search keys in the tree, and that they each
hashed up to the search key root hash of the day signed by the CA6, the user would
be convinced of the non-existence of Bob’s certificate.
Note what is proved in each step of the verification. By checking that each search
key hashes upwards to the root hash, the user verifies that the two search keys are in
the tree. By checking the adjacency of the hash paths, the user verifies that the two
search keys are adjacent in the tree. Since the two search keys are adjacent, Bob’s
search key could not be between them, so Bob’s certificate is not in the tree. Both
checks are necessary to prevent the directory from creating false non-existence proofs.
By requiring directories to prove non-existence of certificates, the EFECT direc-
tories can be truly untrusted unlike the X.509 directories. By requiring users to trust
directories, the X.509 scheme sacrifices security to gain efficiency in certificate distri-
bution. The EFECT scheme requires no such security sacrifice for efficient certificate
distribution.
3.5 Other Certificate Schemes
There are many other certificate schemes that have been proposed as improvements
to X.509. Some of these schemes are Micali’s CRS1 and CRS2 [CRS], Kocher’s
CRT [CRT], Naor-Nissim’s 23CRT [23CRT], and SDSI/SPKI [SDSI]. Since EFECT
is an attempt to improve upon X.509, it would seem logical to address these others
6To enable directories to do proofs of non-existence, the CA must broadcast not just one signed
root value of the day, but two. The message would include a timestamp, the root hash value hashing
over certificate bodies (for certificate verification), the root hash value hashing over search keys (for
non-existence proofs), and the CA’s signature over these three things.
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attempts at improvement.
This thesis focuses only on X.509 and EFECT for a few reasons. First, it makes
sense to compare EFECT to the most commonly used certificate scheme, which is
certainly X.509 right now. Also, because X.509 is the scheme in common use today,
software implementations of X.509 were easily attainable for the benchmark compar-
ison in section 6.2.2.
Also, the major differences between EFECT and X.509 also exist between EFECT
and all of the above-mentioned schemes: X.509 and all of the above-mentioned
schemes involve individually signed certificates that may be revoked before their expi-
ration date. EFECT certificates are not individually signed, nor can they be revoked
before their expiration. This property that EFECT certificates are never revoked or
negated once issued is referred to as monotonicity in the literature.
Because of the central difference in individual signing and monotonicity, the ar-
guments about stronger CA security, easier recovery from CA key compromise, and
better support for long term signatures and atomic certificates still hold for EFECT
versus any of the above-mentioned schemes. The argument about untrusted directo-
ries holds against any of the above-mentioned schemes except CRS2 (CRS2 directories
can also prove non-existence).
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Chapter 4
Requirements and Design
Decisions
This chapter describes the various parts of the EFECT prototype, what the require-
ments were for these parts, and what design decisions were made in order to meet
those requirements.
4.1 Client Browser
The client browser allows a user to acquire and manage EFECT certificates. It can
be configured to connect to any EFECT directory server on the Internet, and the CA
public key is configurable. Using the client browser, a user can download EFECT
certificates from a network directory, verify proofs of certificate non-existence from
such a directory, verify and examine certificates, and store and load certificates to
and from the local disk.
The first requirement for the client browser part of the prototype was that it must
have a graphical user interface (GUI). The second requirement for the client browser
was that it must be as portable as possible. These requirements were chosen to ensure
that the users of the EFECT system would be able to use an easily understandable
interface on any computer anywhere, regardless of operating system.
In order to meet both of these requirements, I chose to implement the client
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browser in Java. The Java Swing package provides a way to write graphical user
interfaces that will run on any operating system to which Java has been ported (both
Windows and Unix).
4.2 Certificate Verification Tree
The certificate verification tree part of the prototype is an implementation of the tree
described in [EFECT]. It is a Merkle tree (hashes at every node) overlayed on top of a
B+tree. The order of the tree, k, can be changed during compilation. The certificate
verification tree implementation supports insertion, deletion, various searches, and
calculation of the hashes.
The first requirement for the certificate verification tree was that it must be fast.
The second requirement for the tree was that it must present a clean interface for
tree operations (insertion, deletion, hashing, etc.). The speed requirement was meant
to ensure that a server performing tree searches would be able to handle heavy query
loads. The interface requirement was meant to ensure that there would be a clean,
modular separation between the tree code and the directory server code.
In order to meet these requirements, I chose to implement the certificate verifica-
tion tree in C++. I decided that an object-oriented interface to the tree operations
would be the cleanest, which narrowed the language choice to Java or C++. The
performance penalty associated with Java was not acceptable for this part of the
system, violating the first requirement, so I chose C++.
4.3 Directory Server
The directory server is the replacement for the “repository” of the X.509 system. The
directory server maintains a copy of a given day’s certificate verification tree. Over
a network, the server answers client queries about certificates in its tree. There can
be many instances of the directory server running in many different locations. This
mirroring of the tree enhances performance of the system and poses no additional
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problems of trust: the directories can be truly untrusted due to their ability to prove
certificate non-existence.
The requirement for the directory server was that it must be fast, and that it must
be able to service multiple requests from the network concurrently without blocking
on any one of them. Also, the directory server must use the interface provided by the
certificate verification tree.
I could have chosen a threaded Java server to handle the multiple concurrent
connection requirement, but Java would have violated the speed requirement. Also,
the interface to the tree would not have been very clean because it would have involved
native (non-Java) function calls within the Java code.
I chose to implement the directory server in C for three reasons. First of all, C is
fast and would satisfy the speed requirement. My second reason was that C has easy
access to a non-blocking network programming interface. This interface would allow
the program to service multiple requests in a single thread of control, eliminating
the need to use multithreading. Eliminating multithreading is highly desirable in
terms of both program complexity and performance. In a multithreaded program,
one must lock all of the tree data structures before using them in order to prevent race
conditions. If done improperly, the locking (or lack thereof) can cause bugs that are
very hard to find. Even if done correctly, the locking and the thread context switching
waste computer cycles that could be better spent servicing requests. My third reason
for choosing C was that it would be easy to use the C++ tree implementation from
a C program.
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Chapter 5
Implementation Details
5.1 Client Browser
I wrote the client browser in Java, using Java’s Swing package to implement the
graphical user interface. I used Java’s security package for the SHA-1 hash function,
the DSA signature algorithm, and for parsing of X.509 certificates.
There are two threads of control in the client browser. One thread does all of
the network communications (sending and receiving), and the other thread does ev-
erything else: responds to GUI input, performs cryptographic computations, and
performs file system I/O. I kept the limit at two threads to simplify the program-
ming, as complex multithreaded programs are notoriously difficult to write correctly.
I broke the threads up this way because the network operations are the only ones that
can block for long periods. By isolating the blocking network calls into a separate
thread, I gained the ability to interrupt those calls with a stop button on the GUI.
Java’s old thread control methods (suspend(), stop(), etc.) have been depre-
cated due to their unsafe nature. Some of them allow race conditions while others
allow deadlocks. To do safe thread control, I devised a new method called safeStop()
for stopping the network thread. The idea was that the user should be able to stop
that thread with the push of a GUI button.
The basic idea behind safeStop() is that it sets a variable, indicating that the
thread should stop. The thread polls this variable periodically to see if it has been
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asked to stop. The one problem is that the network thread may block during network
reads. If the user were to push the stop button during a read, the thread would
not stop because it wouldn’t be able to poll the variable while blocking. To fix this,
safeStop() shuts the network socket, interrupting any blocking reads or writes. The
network thread gets an exception, polls the variable (which tells it to stop), and stops.
Computed results from the network thread get passed back to the GUI thread
via a Vector. Some result passing was necessary, because the network thread cannot
draw things on the screen in a thread-safe manner.
Most of the complexity of the client browser comes from the fact that it uses two
threads. More threads would have further complicated it, and fewer threads would
not have allowed the client to interrupt slow operations.
5.2 Certificate Verification Tree
The certificate verification tree was written in C++, using OpenSSL for the SHA-1
hash function.
First, I wrote the B+tree code. All nodes contain pointers to keys, leaf nodes
contain pointers to data, and non-leaf nodes contain pointers to children. I used
textbook pseudo-code definitions of the B+tree operations (search, insert, and delete)
as the basis of this part of my code. Then, I added the hashes to each node, and
wrote methods to hash the tree from the bottom up. Finally, I added methods to
extract hash paths and certificates for a given search key.
The certificate verification tree is the part of the prototype that it is farthest from
what a real system would need in terms of optimizations. By using pointers explicitly,
the existing implementation assumes that all objects are in memory. In a production
system, the entire tree would not be in memory all at once, so the representation
would need to be changed. Section 7.1 discusses the changes that would be necessary
in a real system.
Fortunately, there is a good abstraction layer between the certificate verification
tree and the directory server. The changes outlined in section 7.1 could be made with
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a very small number of changes to the directory server code.
5.3 Directory Server
The directory server was written mainly in C, with the only C++ features used being
the object-oriented calls to the certificate verification tree. Network I/O is done in
a non-blocking manner using callbacks. This allows the server to handle multiple
network connections simultaneously without using threading or multiple processes.
This simpler design was much easier to write and debug, and can even outperform
a threaded version in cases where the overhead of the threading library is very high
(many simultaneous requests).
The server supports a few different modes of operation to allow for different kinds
of certificates. The most common mode of operation is to allow anyone to ask for
any certificate in the tree, and to allow anyone to ask for non-existence proofs for
certificates not in the tree. This is the mode of operation that a directory server for
a tree full of public key certificates would use.
There is also a mode of operation where one can only get the hash path for
a certificate by presenting the certificate body, and where non-existence proofs are
not supported. This mode of operation would be appropriate for a certified tree of
sensitive personal data. In this case the server should not give out the data to unau-
thorized clients, nor should the server reveal which users are in the database. Since
the non-existence proofs reveal user names from the database, they are disallowed in
this mode of operation.
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Chapter 6
Experiments
6.1 Experimental Apparatus
The benchmarks in section 6.2.1 were measured on a Sun Ultra 30 running Solaris 2.6
with 512 MB of physical memory and 1.5 GB of swap. All code was compiled us-
ing GCC 2.8.1. Routines for crypto (SHA-1 and DSA) and X.509 were taken from
OpenSSL 0.9.6-beta1.
Initially, the benchmarks in section 6.2.2 were also measured on that same ma-
chine. For reasons that will be discussed in section 6.3, the experiment ended up
being run on a second machine. The second machine was a Sun Ultra 60 running
Solaris 2.8 with 1024 MB of physical memory and 2 GB of swap. The compilers and
libraries were the same as on the first machine.
6.2 Experimental Questions
Experiments were performed to find two answers. The first answer we were looking for
was the optimal value of k, the order of the CVT. The second answer we were seeking
was how the EFECT prototype (using the optimal k) compares to a comparable X.509
system in terms of performance in an off-line, bulk verification scenario. This scenario
was meant to model the daily computation performed by a merchant verifying many
customer certificates (credit cards).
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6.2.1 Order of the Certificate Verification Tree
The order k of the CVT determines the branching factor of the tree. Since a non-root
node must have at least k search keys and no more than 2k search keys, the branching
factor is at least k+1 and at most 2k+1. This branching factor determines the length
of a hash path from a tree of a given size and affects the running time of the tree
operations.
Hash Path Length
It is possible to compute the number of hashes in a hash path from a CVT as a
function of k, the order of the tree, and n, the number of certificates in the tree.
hashpathlength(n, k) = (k + 1.1)(
lnn− ln k
ln (k + 1)
+ 1) + 0.1 (6.1)
hashpathlength(n, k) = (2k + 1.1)(
lnn− ln 2k
ln (2k + 1)
+ 1) + 0.1 (6.2)
Equation 6.1 describes the length of a hash path (in number of hashes) for a minimally
full B+tree while equation 6.2 is the analogous equation for a full B+tree.
These two length equations are plotted against n for various k in figure 6-1. The
figure shows that a k of 1 minimizes the length for full trees while a k of 2 minimizes the
length for minimally full trees. As one goes from full to non-full trees, the optimality
of k = 1 quickly disappears, with that hash path length rising to almost the length
at k = 4. Given this behavior, the k of 2 should minimize the length of the hash path
for realistic trees.
The theory was supported by an experiment measuring the average lengths of
hash paths on trees with 300,000 certificates and various values of k. Table 6.1
indicates that the k of 2 does indeed minimize the average hash path length. Note
that averaging was necessary because the hash paths from non-full B+trees do not
have the same length.
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Figure 6-1: Plots of Hash Path Length vs. Tree Size (for various k’s and tree full-
nesses)
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k Average Hash Path Length (in bytes)
1 868.4
2 804.5
3 842.1
4 891.4
5 960.9
6 1056.2
7 1097.2
8 1126.3
9 1177.0
10 1241.8
Table 6.1: Experimentally Measured Avg. Hash Path Lengths for n = 300, 000
Tree Search Speed
The search speed running time was not formally analyzed. A real implementation
of a CVT would perform explicit management of a memory cache of nodes (see
section 7.1). The formal analysis would basically be a cache-miss analysis of the
search algorithms parameterized on Z, the size of the memory cache. Since the
prototype implementation does not do this memory caching explicitly, its performance
is intrinsically bound to the performance of the virtual memory subsystem of the
underlying operating system.
A formal analysis of the interaction between the CVT and Solaris’s virtual memory
subsystem was not feasible, so an empirical analysis was performed instead. Speed
measurements were taken for the various tree operations (building, hashing, and
search) on trees with 300,000 certificates and various values of k. For each value of
k, the time to build the tree from scratch was measured, the time to hash the entire
tree was measured, and the total time required to do one hash path search for each
key in the tree was measured. This whole process was repeated in a sequential loop
ten times for each value of k (k = 1, k = 2, ..., k = 10, k = 1, k = 2, ...) The final time
values for each k were obtained by averaging over the 10 trials for that k. Figure 6-2
shows the results of these measurements.
The search measurement is the most important as it measures the time to extract
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Figure 6-2: Plots of Speeds of Various Tree Operations vs. k (for n = 300, 000)
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a hash path given a search key. In EFECT, this search operation occurs much more
frequently than tree building or hashing of the tree. In terms of speed performance,
the search time is the most important thing to optimize. This speed optimization
must be balanced against the hash path size optimization discussed previously.
The optimal search speed happens when k = 5, but it is not significantly faster
than the speed at k = 4. Since the hash path gets smaller with smaller k around this
point, we chose the value of k = 4 for the tests against X.509 in the next section (in
order to have good speed and small certificates). Luckily, the speeds for tree building
and hashing are also near optimal at k = 4.
6.2.2 Relative Performance of EFECT and X.509
It is claimed in [EFECT] that verification in the EFECT scheme is much faster than
verification in the X.509 scheme. This experiment was designed to investigate that
claim in an off-line verification scenario.
Off-line Bulk Verification Scenario
The off-line verification scenario is as follows. An X.509 verifier verifies the signature
on the day’s CRL once at the beginning of the day. Then for each X.509 certificate,
the X.509 verifier verifies the signature on the certificate and scans the day’s CRL for
that certificate’s serial number. An EFECT verifier verifies the signature on the root
of the day once at the beginning of the day. Then for each EFECT certificate, the
EFECT verifier verifies that the certificate’s hash path hashes up to the signed root
of the day. Each verifier will verify many certificates during the day (thousands of
verifications). All verification is off-line except for the initial verification of the CRL
or the signed root.
This experiment was meant to model what a busy merchant would do in a day of
verifying something like a credit card certificate. The model was chosen because it is a
model in which verification time savings will be most pronounced (the per-certificate
time saved is multiplied by the large number of verifications performed). Another
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reason this model is relevant is because EFECT certificates can be significantly smaller
than X.509 certificates when grouped together, allowing more of them to fit on a smart
card (the credit card being verified). EFECT’s good performance in this experiment
would indicate an area where EFECT has multiple significant advantages over X.509.
Benchmark Details
The benchmark had two main phases:
1. For each of 300,000 users, certificates were created and written to disk for each
of the three schemes to be tested: EFECT with SHA-1, X.509 with DSA and
SHA-1, and X.509 with RSA and SHA-1.
2. For each of 300,000 users, the X.509 DSA certificate was verified, the EFECT
certificate was verified, and the X.509 RSA certificate was verified (in that
order). All verifications were timed using a microsecond timer.
The certificate bodies for all three schemes were identical: a fixed PGP 1024-bit
public RSA key with the given user’s name prepended. Since we were not interested
in extracting information from the certificates themselves, the X.509 format was not
actually used. Verification times depend mainly on the length of the data in question,
not on its specific content. This certificate format was chosen for simplicity. Had the
actual X.509 format been used, the results would not have been significantly different.
For EFECT, the root was signed using a 2048-bit DSA key. For X.509 with DSA,
the certificates and the CRL were signed using the same 2048-bit DSA key as used in
EFECT. For X.509 with RSA, the certificates and the CRL were signed using a 2048-
bit RSA key. The two CRL’s were identical (except for the signatures). They each
contained the same 10% of the certificate serial numbers (every tenth serial number
was on the list). The serial numbers were not actually written on the certificates, but
were implied by the sorted order of the usernames.
EFECT verification time includes the time to hash up the path to the alleged root
plus the time to compare the alleged root to the signed root. X.509 verification time
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Certificate Mean Verification Standard Deviation
Scheme Time (in µs) (in µs)
EFECT with SHA-1 160.0 8.3
X.509 with DSA and SHA-1 73656.7 9612.9
X.509 with RSA and SHA-1 6259.5 2995.9
Table 6.2: Mean Verification Times and Standard Deviations for EFECT and X.509
includes the time to verify the digital signature plus the time to do a binary search
on the CRL for the certificate’s serial number.
EFECT verification times do not include the time to verify the DSA signature on
the root. X.509 verification times do not include the time to verify the signature on
the CRL. Since these verifications only happen once per day, the differences in their
times are not important.
For each of the schemes, the 300,000 verification times were averaged. These
means (and their standard deviations) are shown in table 6.2.
None of the verification times include disk accesses. Variations in disk access
times would have been nearly as large as the verification times themselves, making
the timing data useless.
Actually, the first version of this experiment was aborted when it was discovered
that the directory being accessed was an NFS mount rather than a local hard disk.
This was discovered because the experiment had taken an order of magnitude longer
to run than had been predicted, and still was not finished. When this was discovered,
the experiment was moved to an isolated machine with a large local disk. It is worth
noting that the non-local file system affected performance of the system far more than
the certificate verification scheme used.
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6.3 Conclusions
The parameter k, the order of the EFECT CVT, affects both the size of the hash
paths associated with EFECT certificates and the speed at which a server can extract
those paths from the tree. Unfortunately, space optimality and speed optimality occur
at different values of k. Fortunately, the two optimal values were not too far apart.
The calculations and experiments from section 6.2.1 indicate that smaller k results
in shorter hash paths for k ≥ 2. Section 6.2.1 also showed that a k of 5 provides
the fastest hash path search time,1 but that k = 4 was approximately as fast and
would result in smaller hash paths. This k of 4 was used in the benchmark comparing
EFECT and X.509.
Certificate verification is significantly faster in the EFECT scheme than in the
X.509 scheme. EFECT verification is about 460 times faster than DSA X.509 verifi-
cation and about 39 times faster than RSA X.509 verification. However, it is worth
noting that these speed savings are less significant in any verification system that
stores certificates on a hard disk. This is because the time difference between ver-
ification schemes is on the order of the time required for a hard disk access. In a
verification system accessing a networked file system, the verification time savings
become completely insignificant compared to the amount of time spent accessing the
file system.
So although EFECT is indeed faster for verification, its novel properties (as de-
scribed in section 3.4) are probably more important than any verification speed gains.
It would be wise for authors designing future schemes to notice this fact: further ver-
ification speed gains probably are not meaningful in real systems.
1Note that this k of 5 was empirically determined, and that a system that implements the explicit
node caching described in section 7.1 would probably have a different optimal value of k.
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Chapter 7
Future Work
This chapter discusses aspects of the prototype that could be improved by future
work. These ideas were considered but rejected due to time constraints.
7.1 Memory Cache Manager
For optimal performance, the certificate verification tree routines should utilize a
custom memory cache manager that would move tree nodes between memory and
disk appropriately. This cache manager would be tailored to the tree algorithms,
having an appropriate replacement policy and performing occasional prefetching of
nodes.
The tree routines would have to request nodes from the cache manager before
using those nodes, and would relinquish nodes when through with them. The cache
manager would pin a node in memory upon request, only moving it back to disk after
the application relinquished it. The cache manager could also keep non-requested
nodes in memory as per its prefetching strategy and replacement policy. Between a
routine’s requesting a node and relinquishing that node, the cache manager would
provide the routine with access to the node through accessor functions using some
handle to identify the node. By routing the node accesses through accessor functions,
the cache manager could easily keep track of dirty nodes and access patterns. This
information would make the cache manager more efficient because it would not have
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to write non-dirty nodes back to disk, and it would have more detailed information
available for prefetching and the replacement policy.
Prefetching would only make sense during horizontal tree traversal. This is be-
cause during vertical traversal, there is no way to predict which child will be accessed.
During horizontal traversal, all siblings of a given node are generally accessed (to
gather the appropriate hashes for verifying a certificate). Given this, a good prefetch-
ing strategy would be to prefetch sibling groups during horizontal traversal. The
accessor functions should be written in such a way as to make it easy for the cache
manager to determine the traversal direction of the calling routine.
The replacement policy could be similarly tuned to the access patterns of the tree
routines. It is known that the tree searches go down the tree to the bottom and
come back up those same nodes, traversing siblings at each level. Given this traversal
pattern, the cache manager knows that once the routine has moved up past a given
node, that node will not be used again.
Tuning the replacement policy to this access pattern would result in a lower per-
centage of cache misses than that achieved by the operating system and its general
purpose replacement policy for its virtual memory system. Another reason the cache
manager would increase performance is that it would use a page size appropriate for
the size of a tree node, rather than a general purpose page size used by the operating
system.
The cache manager would make it possible to run the directory server on a machine
with a small virtual memory. We would never need too much virtual memory at any
one time (just enough for a path down or across the tree). In the current prototype,
the entire tree resides in virtual memory, making it impossible to serve large trees on
machines with small virtual memories.
This cache manager optimization was not done due to time constraints. It would
involve replacing the pointer fields in each node with a handle understood by the
cache manager. It would also require making each tree node a fixed size, with search
keys embedded in the nodes. Currently the search keys reside outside of the nodes
with the nodes holding only pointers to them. Currently, the certificates also reside
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outside of the nodes. In a tree full of small atomic certificates, the certificates should
probably be moved into the nodes. In a tree of public key certificates, the certificates
should probably be nodes of their own as their size would be comparable to the size
of non-leaf nodes.
Note that this optimization could change the empirically determined value of k
from section 6.2.1, as the operating system’s virtual memory performance may well
have determined that value.
7.2 CA Servicing of User Requests
The current prototype has a fixed tree that it serves. Currently, there are no mech-
anisms for changing the tree other than the low-level C tree library routines for
insertion and deletion. In a real system, the CA would want some high-level way
to queue up certificate creation and revocation requests and incorporate those user
requests into the next day’s tree. This high-level user request queue interface would
be implemented using the low-level tree interface.
The details of servicing user requests would depend heavily on the nature of the
CA. A credit card company would already have mechanisms for processing new card
and revocation requests. A credit card CA would then just add software to reframe
the requests as tree operations for the next time period. Basically, this issue is not
directly related to the EFECT scheme. It is just a matter of how a real company
or organization processes input from its customers or members. The requests from
the customers or members would just need to be mapped into tree operations, which
would be queued up for the next time period.
At the beginning of the next time period, the CA would perform the necessary tree
manipulations (insertion for issuing a certificate and deletion for revoking a certifi-
cate), and would rehash the necessary parts of the tree. Finally, it would timestamp
and sign the top of this new tree.
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7.3 CA to Directory Communication
In the current prototype, there is no separation between the CA and the certificate
directory. The building, hashing, and signing of the tree are all currently done in
the directory server. In a real system, the CA and the directory would be distinct
entities, so there would need to be some protocol to move the tree between the two.
For efficiency, the CA could send a list of the incremental changes from the last
time period’s tree, rather than a copy of the entire new tree. The incremental change
message would include the search keys of revoked certificates (to be deleted from the
tree), and the search keys and bodies of newly issued certificates. This communication
would be digitally signed by the CA to prevent forgery. Encryption would only be
necessary for trees of sensitive information, not for trees of public keys. Assuming
that there was agreement between the CA and the directories on the order in which
to perform these tree operations, the directories and the CA’s would end up back in
synch for each time period without having to send the entire tree over the network.
In the beginning, a new certificate directory would get an incremental update from
nothing, basically a list of all search keys and certificates in the tree.
For tree rehashing, the two options would be to have the CA send over a signed
list of the new hash values or to have the directories recompute these values locally.
At first it seems wasteful to have the local directories recompute these hashes when
the CA is already computing them. In fact, this rehashing is not an expensive compu-
tation. Doing the rehashing locally is fast enough for an off-line computation, saves
bandwidth by not sending those hashes over the network, and simplifies our design
by not requiring yet another protocol be spoken between the directories and the CA.
Finally, the CA would have to send the directories the timestamped signature for
the new time period.
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7.4 Smart Cards
One of the major uses for EFECT is in a credit card scenario, where the credit card
company would run a CA, certifying the keys of the credit card holders. The credit
card holders would keep their private keys and their certificates on smart cards. Stores
would have smart card readers where customers would insert smart cards in order to
make purchases. The smart card readers in stores would verify the certificate hashes
on a customer’s smart card, as well as performing some sort of challenge/response
protocol with the card in order to verify possession of the private key corresponding
to the certificate.
The current prototype can only store downloaded certificates on the local disk of
the machine running the EFECT client software. Eventually, the client software will
need to be able to store the downloaded certificates onto a smart card. It may be
possible to automatically download and save the user’s certificates on the smart card
in response to the insertion of the card into the card reader. This functionality would
greatly simplify the user experience.
Also, the hash path verification routines currently found in the client software
would need to be ported to the smart card reader. The challenge/response protocol
would need to be written from scratch for the smart card reader as it does not exist
in the current prototype.
7.5 Hash Path Compression
The current encoding of hash paths is not optimal for multiple certificates. When
storing certificates that are nearby nodes in the same CVT, the hash paths will differ
in only a few hashes at the bottom. This hash redundancy means that very good
compression is possible. One such compression scheme would involve a bit flag for each
hash denoting the hash as either a literal value or a reference to another existing hash.
The reference would only have to be a few bits in length. By encoding redundant
hashes as a few bits instead of 20 bytes, we would save significant amounts of space
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when storing adjacent certificates in the tree.
This path compression will be especially important when users have many certifi-
cates to carry on devices with small memories (smart cards, phones, other wireless
devices, etc.).
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Chapter 8
Summary
EFECT is a new certificate scheme that solves the certificate revocation problem
more elegantly than do current schemes like X.509. Compared to X.509, EFECT also
provides faster certificate verification, smaller certificates, fully untrusted certificate
distribution, and better protection against CA key compromises.
The software described in this thesis implements the EFECT scheme and meets
the prototype design requirements. The software is portable and modular, and it
meets speed requirements. Also, it includes a graphical interface for the client.
The order of the EFECT certificate verification tree affects both the size of the
EFECT certificates and the search performance of the tree. An order was found in
this thesis that is nearly optimal for both certificate size and search speed.
The EFECT prototype was configured with this nearly optimal tree order, and an
experiment was conducted to compare the relative performances of EFECT and X.509
in an off-line, bulk verification scenario. The results show that certificate verification
is significantly faster in the EFECT scheme than in the X.509 scheme. It should
be noted that although EFECT verification is faster, the time savings can easily be
dwarfed by the time required to access a file system. EFECT’s other advantages seem
more important than improved verification speed in light of this realization.
The results in this thesis demonstrate that EFECT is a suitable replacement for
X.509 in situations where the certified user population is large, situations where bulk
verification takes place, or situations where certificates must be stored in limited space
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(wireless devices and smart cards). Hopefully after a few future modifications, this
software will be deployed to provide the public key infrastructure in some of these
scenarios.
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